Modelling media ownership limits: the impact of current policy proposals on the UK media market by Schlosberg, Justin
  
 
MEDIA POLICY BRIEF 10 
 
Modelling Media Ownership Limits 
The impact of current policy proposals on the 
UK media market 
 
 
Justin Schlosberg 
 
Birkbeck University of London 
Department of Film, Media and Cultural Studies 
 
2 
 
 
 
 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The author would like to thank Damian Tambini and Sally Broughton Micova 
of the LSE Media Policy Project for their helpful comments and suggestions. 
He would also like to declare an interest as an active participant in the Media 
Reform Coalition, which has produced written and oral testimony on related 
matters for, among others, the Leveson Inquiry into the Ethics and Practices 
of the Press and the Inquiry into Media Plurality by the Lords Select 
Committee for Communications.   
The LSE Media Policy Project is funded by the Higher Education Innovation 
Fund 5. 
LSE Media Policy Project Series Editors: Sally Broughton Micova and Damian 
Tambini 
Creative Commons license, Attribution – Non-Commercial. 
The licence lets others remix, tweak and build upon your work non-commercially, and although their new 
works must also acknowledge you and be non-commercial, they don’t have to license their derivative works 
on the same terms. 
December 2013 
LSE Media Policy Project 
http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mediapolicyproject/ 
 
3 
  
KEY MESSAGES 
 Since the Leveson Inquiry, academic and civil society experts have 
proposed a range of new limits on media ownership, both ceiling limits 
and threshold triggers of targeted behavioural intervention. 
 The impact of these limits in the current situation would be relatively 
minor, even if the ceiling limits were set at the lower bounds of 15% or 
20%, and need not necessarily result in enforced divestment or equate 
to a cap on growth. 
 The BBC should be included in the measurement and monitoring of 
media plurality, but not in prescribed remedies.  
 Plurality policy should address both individual markets for news and 
information (newspapers, radio, television and internet) as well as the 
total media market that extends beyond news providers. 
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Over the last 18 months, there have been no fewer than four public consultations seeking 
evidence in relation to media ownership and plurality policy by the DCMS, the Lords Select 
Committee for Communications, Ofcom and the Leveson Inquiry. In responding to these, a 
number of civil society groups have proposed frameworks for imposing media ownership limits 
both within and across different media sectors. Most involve some kind of limit on market share, 
or threshold levels triggering behavioural obligations.  
One of the stumbling blocks in plurality reform concerns the inherent difficulties in measuring 
media market shares in a converged environment with print news markets facing structural 
decline. Yet there already exist fairly uncontentious measures within markets provided by 
regular industry audits for television, radio and newspapers. They offer tailored metrics of 
audience reach or market capture from which shares commanded by dominant groups can be 
derived. Although there is no standard industry measure for online news reach and share, 
various methodologies have been used that are based on both traffic data and consumer 
market surveys and are comparable to the standards applied in other sectors.  
Another significant challenge concerns how to regulate plurality in a way that, as both Ofcom 
and Lord Justice Leveson have suggested, is not limited to ex-post interventions following 
merger activity. Critics of ownership limits have claimed that they risk unduly penalising 
innovation and competitiveness, and would lead to immediate divestment. This brief assesses 
such claims by reviewing recent proposals for ownership limits in light of industry data.1 It does 
this using a simplified framework showing  the implications of 15%, 20%, 25% and 30% share 
limits in individual media markets and the media market as a whole, both with and without the 
BBC. The findings indicate that if such limits were implemented now,  the impact on markets 
would be relatively minor  - even if the limits were set at 15% or 20% - and would not 
necessarily trigger divestment or equate to a cap on growth. This brief then examines the 
details of the proposals put forth by the main civil society groups campaigning on this issue. It 
identifies the most common position among them as one that involves a 15% limit that would 
trigger public interest remedies along with a 20% cap that would trigger structural remedies, and 
includes the BBC in measurement, but not in those remedies.  
 
  
INTRODUCTION  
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In regards to national newspaper ownership (the focus of the Leveson Inquiry) a range of limits 
have been proposed based on the market shares of dominant groups. In his testimony to the 
Leveson Inquiry, Labour leader Ed Miliband suggested that a market share limit on national 
newspaper publishers should be set “somewhere between 20% and 30%”. In its evidence to the 
Inquiry into Media Plurality by the Lords Select Committee for Communications, campaign 
group Avaaz called for a 20% market limit in all of the main media markets, and the National 
Union of Journalists (NUJ) mentioned a 25% limit. In its evidence and testimony to the Leveson 
Inquiry, the Media Reform Coalition (MRC) called for an initial threshold of 15% (triggering 
public interest obligations) in all media markets, followed by a ‘ceiling’ of 20% (triggering 
structural remedies).2 The details of some of these proposals are analysed in the next section. 
This principle of a ‘behavioural’ threshold followed by a ceiling was echoed in Harriet Harman’s 
speech for the Charles Wheeler lecture in June 2013.   
 
The proposals described above were made in the abstract, although no doubt based on certain 
understandings of the conditions in various media markets. One way to consider the proposals 
made is to apply them to current market conditions in the UK. Therefore in this section, the four 
levels of proposed limits, 15%, 20%, 25% and 30%, are tested for their potential impact in 
current market conditions. It first addresses key media markets individually and then considers 
the picture across sectors. It does this using publicly available data from accepted methods of 
measurement used in the industry and by Ofcom.  
  
National Newspapers 
Figure 1 below illustrates the combined market share (daily and Sundays) for national 
newspapers based on circulation figures between March and August 2013, along with the 
various percentages proposed for triggering intervention. The Audit Bureau of Circulations 
(ABC) measures circulation based primarily on retail sales and subscriptions for both print and 
digital editions. It excludes marginal outlets, so in the figure below market shares are based on 
a definition of the total market limited to the combined circulation of major titles as listed. 
 
  
MODELLING THE PROPOSALS 
 
8 
Figure 1: Shares of national newspaper circulation by publisher in March-August 2013 
and levels of proposed thresholds (%) 
 
Source: TheGuardian.com, 'National Newspaper ABC figures 2013'. Available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/media/page/2013/mar/08/1 (accessed 17 October 2013) 
Notes: Data based on figures produced by ABC for average daily circulation between March and August 2013 inclusive. A 
combined circulation of Daily and Sunday titles has been derived by multiplying the Daily averages by six and then adding to the 
Sunday average. Shares are then calculated based on the total circulation of the titles measured and attributed to publishers, all 
of whom own individual titles outright. Daily Record and Sunday Mail excluded as they are included as regional titles in figure 2.  
 
Under MRC and NUJ proposals, both News UK and the Daily Mail and General Trust (DMGT) 
would breach the lower limit of 15% triggering public interest obligations. A range of possible 
remedies have been suggested, many of which target the 
ability of owners to exercise editorial influence over their titles. 
This objective addresses core plurality concerns raised in the 
aftermath of the Leveson Inquiry without recourse to content 
controls akin to those inscribed in the broadcasting code. It 
limits the scope of proprietors seeking to use their outlets to 
dominate public conversation and, by extension, as leverage 
for political influence.  
Measures such as independent boards with powers over 
editorial appointments have a track record in media merger 
conditions. Although questions have been raised as to their 
efficacy, they offer useful precedents as a basis for developing 
more robust models of internal democracy within titles owned 
by a dominant interest.  
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As part of a concession by 
Newscorp to enable its 
purchase of The Times and 
Sunday Times in 1981, the 
board of Independent 
National Directors at The 
Times was granted veto 
power over the appointment 
and dismissal of editors.   
An independent editorial 
board was similarly 
established at the 
Nottingham Evening Post in 
1994 as part of the 
undertakings agreed 
between DMGT and 
competition authorities prior 
to merger approval. 
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Under all limit proposals examined here only News UK would be subject to a 
structural remedy such as divestment according to recent market data. DMGT titles 
would at least be subject to public interest obligations such as editorial boards, but 
no other titles or groups would be affected. 
As well as public interest obligations, News UK would be subject to a 'ceiling' limit under most 
proposals (including those put forward by the NUJ, MRC and Avaaz). Under MRC and Avaaz 
proposals, DMGT would also be subject to such an upper limit. Given that News UK owns a 
selection of titles, an appropriate structural remedy might be divestment of one or more titles in 
order to bring the group's share beneath the ceiling threshold. However, if market conditions 
were such that the sale of a given title could threaten its viability, or a buyer could not be found, 
then an alternative remedy might be aimed at reducing the shareholdings or voting power of the 
interest in question.  
This could be achieved via a number of means, including equity carve-out or the transferral of 
voting rights from shareholders to employees. It could provide added protection for journalist 
and editorial autonomy without unduly 'penalising' a given title for breaching the upper limit 
either because of its competitiveness, or because the closure of other titles increased its market 
share by default. At the same time, such a policy would recognise that a media market share is 
to some degree associated with a 'share of voice' and as such, dominance invokes wider 
concerns than those based solely on preserving market efficiency and competition.  
 
 
 
 
Local Newspapers 
No ownership limits have been explicitly proposed for local newspaper markets. However, 
unlike the national newspaper market, ownership concentration among local news publishers is 
advancing rapidly.  Figure 2 illustrates the share of total local newspaper circulation 
commanded by the top five publishers. It is based on data provided by the Newspaper Society, 
which retains an up-to-date register of all local and regional titles and compiles circulation data 
based on figures provided by both the ABC and individual publishers.  
As with national newspapers, marginal titles are excluded and shares are derived based on a 
total market definition restricted to the circulation of the top 20 publishers. Although the number 
of titles excluded from this is inevitably greater than the number excluded from the national 
market, the total circulation commanded by other local and regional titles is estimated to total 
less than 3% of the top 20 total (according to the Newspaper Society).   
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Figure 2: Shares of total local newspaper circulation by publisher in January 2013(%) 
 
Source: Newspaper Society (2013), Top Twenty Regional Publishers, January 2013. Available at 
http://www.newspapersoc.org.uk/sites/default/files/pdf/Top-20-Publishers_January-2013.pdf  
Notes: Data based on combining total circulation for all local and regional titles by top 20 publishers including dailies, weeklies 
and Sundays, both paid and free, averaged according to unit for month of January 2013. Excludes monthly and fortnightly titles. 
ILondon Evening Standard, City AM, Metros, Daily Record, Sunday Post and Sunday Mail are included as regionals. Based on 
newspaper titles with their own circulation/distribution figures as listed on the Newspaper Society database and therefore does 
not necessarily reflect all titles published by each group.  
 
Limits on circulation share along the lines proposed for national newspapers could be imposed 
on the total regional and local market as depicted in Figure 2.  In this case, Trinity Mirror alone 
would be subject to plurality intervention at the first two levels.   
This does not take account of concentration within particular local news markets.  Analysis of 
markets based on Local Government Authorities (LGAs) shows that even the highest limit of 
30% circulation share would affect most local titles currently in operation, if it were applied to 
individual markets on this scale.3 In two-thirds of LGAs, a single local newspaper commands 
over 50% of the market, and over half of this group have 100% monopolies; a quarter of LGAs 
have no local newspaper at all. 
Although plurality remedies need not threaten the viability of any newspaper,  given variance 
between local news markets and the added complexities in defining them, the most effective 
means of regulating for plurality might be a cross-market share limit (as illustrated in Figure 2) 
combined with a series of subsidiary policies aimed at promoting local plurality. In this respect, a 
range of potential measures have been proposed, including a ban on local media owners 
standing for local elections; a system of cross-subsidies to support entry-level journalism jobs 
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If applied to local newspapers, ownership limits across the board would impact 
only Trinity Mirror. Given the fragility of local newspaper markets, ownership limits 
could be accompanied by subsidiary policies aimed at promoting plurality. 
 
and cooperative and non-traditional news start-ups; legislative amendments to enable local 
newspapers to apply for charitable status; and measures to enable local communities to take 
over titles or brands disposed of by multiples.  
 
Radio 
Radio plurality can be calculated in a number of different ways, depending on how the BBC is 
treated in the measurement and what kind of radio suppliers are considered. Figure 3 presents 
a straightforward recent breakdown of market shares controlled by the major radio groups, as 
defined by share of annual total radio listening hours. It illustrates the same “red lines” for the 
market limits proposed by the various civil society groups used above. 
Figure 3: Share of all radio listening hours held by major radio groups in the year ending 
31 March 2013(%) 
 
Source: Ofcom, Communications Market Report 2013, p. 232. Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_3.pdf  (accessed 26 October 2013).  
Notes: Figures are based on RAJAR data for year ending 31 March 2013. Rajar data based on survey of weekly radio use, 
sample 110,000.  
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If BBC is included in the measurement only Global would be subject to remedies at 
the lowest proposed limits when looking at group market share, but when considering 
wholesale news provision, Sky breaches all four proposed market share limits. 
 
If the BBC is included in the measurement, only Global Radio will be subject to remedies at the 
lowest threshold of 15%. At the time of writing, Global has acquired Real and Smooth Ltd and is 
appealing a decision by the Competition Commission requiring it to sell certain stations in order 
to secure merger approval. Depending on the outcome of this, Global may breach the 20% 
threshold.  If the BBC is excluded, both Global and Bauer would be subject to intervention at the 
15%, 20% and 25% levels, but only Global would be affected at the highest proposed limit of 
30%.  
The figure above illustrates a common measure of radio listening in general. If we focus on 
wholesale news provision, however, the picture looks very different. In this case just two 
providers – the BBC and Sky – dominate the sector. In its report on the public interest test for 
BskyB’s proposed acquisition of News Corp in 2010, Ofcom found that Sky supplied news 
services to virtually all commercial stations, with a total share of 43.6% of overall listening hours 
(including the BBC in measurement).4 If we were to attribute market share to wholesale news 
providers on this basis, Sky’s position would trigger intervention under all four of the proposed 
limits, whether or not the BBC is included in the measurement. 
It should be emphasised that these figures are not based on listening hours for news 
programmes specifically. Given that radio is often listened to ‘in the background’ with regular 
news bulletins interrupting formats, identifying direct market shares of wholesale news providers 
is difficult. However, in 2012 Ofcom did conduct an analysis of survey data based on the reach 
of news programmes specifically, which yielded a 62% share for all BBC radio and a 38% share 
for commercial radio (virtually all of which is provided by Sky).5 The impact of ownership limits in 
this case would be unchanged, as all four limits would be breached by Sky including and 
excluding the BBC in measurement.  
 
If ownership limits within individual markets are intended to address agenda setting power by 
news organisations, it makes sense to focus on wholesale news provision. However, if it is 
determined that the market is insufficient to support more than two providers (BBC and Sky), 
then an appropriate structural remedy might be based on equity carve-out or the prescribed sale 
of shareholdings in order to create a new independent company and eliminate a controlling 
interest in the outlet. 
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Television 
The following analysis uses the same approach adopted for radio above, first examining the 
shares of overall viewing figures commanded by the major broadcasters. This is illustrated in 
Figure 4 and is derived by the industry's standard ratings audit conducted by the Broadcasters 
Audience Research Board (BARB). Data is collected based on a selected sample of 5,000 
households across the UK.  
Figure 4: Audience shares of major TV broadcasters for 2012 (%) 
 
Source: Ofcom (2013), Communications Market Report. Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/cmr/cmr13/UK_2.pdf, p. 194 (accessed 10 October 2013) 
Notes: Data include average overall ratings for channel portfolios in multichannel households, 2012.  
 
If the BBC is included, ITV alone would be subject to remedies at the lower limits of 15 and 20%. 
If the BBC is excluded from the measurement, ITV breaches all four limits and Channel 4 
surpasses 15%.  
Looking at wholesale news provision, however, the BBC is overwhelmingly dominant as 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
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The BBC has by far the largest share of television news audiences. Only ITN would 
breach the lowest market share limit of 15% when the BBC is included. 
 
Figure 5: Share of viewing of national and international television news by wholesale 
providers in 2011(%) 
 
Source: Ofcom (2012), News Consumption in the UK, p. 23 Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/statement/Annex4.pdf (accessed 10 October 2013) 
Notes: Data in table is extrapolated from shares of news viewing on BBC, ITV, Channel 4, Channel 5 and Sky. Shares are of 
the total viewing of National/International News on the BBC, ITV, Channel4, Channel 5 and Sky only. The shares of ITV, 
Channel 4 and Channel 5 are combined under ITN, which is the wholesale provider for these channels. Figures based on BARB 
data for total daily minutes of viewing in national/international news genre for 2011. 
 
There are only three main providers with ITN currently providing wholesale news services for 
ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5.  In this case, where the BBC is included in the measurement, 
only ITN breaches the lowest threshold of 15%. Where the BBC is excluded, both ITN and Sky 
breach all four limits.  
 
It is worth noting that both Sky Radio News and ITN are already subject to due impartiality rules 
and other provisions contained within the Broadcasting Code. ITV is also subject to additional 
regulations according to its specific public service mandate, which includes minimum spends on 
current affairs. Impartiality rules by default protect to some degree against excessive 
shareholder influence over the content of news broadcasts. In light of this, public interest 
obligations might reasonably be considered redundant if they are oriented towards protecting 
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editorial autonomy. In regards to ceiling limits, no television news provider would be subject to 
remedies under existing proposals and based on current market conditions. 
 
Online News 
Online news consumption is now measured annually by surveys conducted and commissioned 
by Ofcom among others (including Nielsen, Comscore, etc.). Defining a total market for online 
news is more difficult than in other sectors because of the ‘long tail’ of niche news services and 
the blurring boundaries of news online. However, it is clear from Ofcom’s research that news 
consumption online is following a pattern of concentration in favour of traditional news brands, 
as illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
Figure 6: Share of minutes for top 50 websites, grouped by wholesale news provider in 
Q3 2010 (%) 
 
Source: Ofcom (2010), Report on Public Interest Test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group Plc by 
News Corporation. [data from Rajar Q3 2010]. Available at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/public-
interest-test-nov2010/statement/public-interest-test-report.pdf, p. 34 
Notes: News UK share includes Sky News share of 1.8%. Figures exclude regional and international titles for each owner. 
However such titles are included in the total number of minutes from which the percentages are calculated (i.e. the denominator 
includes page views and minutes to regional/international sites). This has the effect of understating the share and reach figures 
for commercial media groups who have regional and international titles, including News UK, DMGT, and Guardian Media Group. 
However, the differences would not alter the impact of thresholds. 
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Measuring market shares in online news can be done using similar principles to 
those underlying industry audits of conventional sectors. 
In this case, only DMGT would be subject to intervention on plurality grounds under the 
proposed limits. If the BBC is included in the measurement, DMGT would only breach the 
lowest limit of 15%. If the BBC is excluded, it would also trigger intervention at the 20% limit. 
However, based on the current market conditions as described above, DMGT would already be 
subject to plurality interventions due to its dominant position in the national newspaper market 
(at the 15% and 20% levels). Applying ownership thresholds to online news would therefore not 
trigger any remedies of its own accord, regardless of which measure is used, and provided that 
remedies triggered in the newspaper market also applied to online operations.  
Nevertheless, the growth of online news audiences and their increasing concentration around 
traditional news brands suggests that this sector should not be excluded from plurality policy. It 
is possible, for instance, that the Guardian's digital growth may propel it above the lowest 
threshold in the near-term future. 
It is worth noting that the above measurement restricts the online news market to the top news 
websites. But in essence, calculating shares based on the traffic for top online news providers is 
no different in principle to the way ABC calculates shares of newspaper circulation insofar as it 
excludes the smallest outlets. Of the top 50 online news providers by browsing minutes, for 
instance, five groups control more than 70% of the user base (BBC, DMGT, Newscorp, 
Guardian and Telegraph) and 37 have less than 1%, which is an indication that any providers 
outside the top 50 can be considered very marginal indeed. 
 
 
 
Cross platform 
Two distinct approaches have been followed for measuring cross platform concentration in 
recent years. The first takes a total media market definition (including online search and social 
media) and then measures concentration based on share of revenues. This formed the basis of 
a proposal put forward by Enders Analysis in 2010. According to their research, only a merged 
Newscorp/BskyB entity would breach a 15% limit.6  
An alternative approach has been adopted by Ofcom, which has measured the ‘share of 
reference’ for major news providers based on consumer survey data.7 With this approach, no 
news provider other than the BBC breaches a 15% threshold. This applies at both the retail and 
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wholesale level and on measures based on both the ‘main’ source of reference and ‘regular’ 
sources. 
The ‘share of reference’ approach has the advantage of capturing a measure of ‘influence’ 
rather than just market power, but is limited to news and information rather than the broader 
media landscape. It is reasonable to assume that the media’s impact on and contribution to 
citizenship extends beyond the output of conventional news and current affairs. Ofcom’s 
approach also fails to capture the filtering influence exercised by online intermediaries, including 
search and social media, which can impact on the flow of news and information in the digital 
sphere.  
Nevertheless, regardless of which approach is adopted, no company would be affected under 
current market conditions at any of the proposed market share limits. However, as with online 
news, ownership limits applied at the cross platform level could be an effective guard against 
potential concentration in the future. 
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The previous section addressed the question of whether the implementation of ownership limits 
could be done without engendering radical upheaval in media industries or threatening market 
competitiveness. It indicated that this is possible even with the lower limits proposed, based on 
market share data used regularly by industry and Ofcom, and by applying a range of remedies 
aimed at distancing proprietors from editorial control. Should some form of limits be accepted by 
policymakers, three further questions will need to be answered: 
 
1) where the limits are set;  
2) where these should be applied; and,  
3) whether or not to include the BBC.  
 
The positions of several civil society groups on these issues are summarised in Table 1 below, 
based on their submissions to the Lords Select Committee on Communications’ inquiry into 
media plurality.8 Ownership limits play two different roles in these proposals.  
 
Some proposed limits are absolute and foreseen to act as a ceiling, above which divestment or 
other ownership changes must be made and mergers prohibited. Other proposed limits are 
suggested as markers, the surpassing of which prompts the application of some kinds of public 
interest obligations or interventions. The groups covered here are those responding to the 
inquiry that a) do not represent commercial interests, b) explicitly reference ownership limits in 
some context, and c) are not single issue campaigns (e.g. European Initiative on Media 
Pluralism). 9 
 
  
PLURALITY REFORM PROPOSALS 
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Table 1: Summary of civil society proposals on media ownership limits 
ORGANISATION SECTOR 
LIMITS 
BASED ON 
AUDIENCE 
SHARE? 
CROSS 
MEDIA LIMITS 
BASED ON 
REVENUE 
SHARE? 
BBC INCLUDED 
IN 
MEASUREMENT? 
BBC 
INCLUDED 
IN 
REMEDIES? 
Campaign for 
Press and 
Broadcasting 
Freedom 
Yes – 15% 
lower limit 
triggering P.I. 
test and 30% 
ceiling 
Yes – based on 
P.I. test 
triggered by 
merger 
Yes No 
Avaaz Yes – 20% 
limit 
No Yes No 
National Union of 
Journalists 
Yes – 15% 
lower limit 
triggering P.I. 
test and 25% 
ceiling 
Not mentioned Not specified No 
Media Standards 
Trust 
Not mentioned Yes – 15% 
based on 
Enders 
definition of 
total media 
market 
Yes Not specified 
Media Reform 
Coalition 
Yes – 15% 
lower limit 
triggering 
public interest 
obligations and 
20% ceiling 
Yes – 15% 
based on 
Enders 
definition of 
total media 
market 
Yes No 
Enders Analysis No Yes – 15% 
based on 
Enders 
definition of 
total media 
market 
Yes Not specified 
 
 
The majority of these groups endorse both sectoral limits based on audience share (e.g. 
television ratings, newspaper circulation, etc.) and a cross-media limit based on revenue share. 
In relation to the former, three of the four groups endorsing sectoral limits favour a lower and 
upper limit with any company in between being subject to prescribed public interest obligations, 
or remedies determined on the basis of a public interest test. In regards to the levels of 
ownership limits, three of the four groups advocating sectoral limits have cited a ‘ceiling’ limit of 
20% or 25% and the same proportion favour a lower limit set at 15%. In regards to a cross 
media limit, the majority of groups examined here endorse Enders’ proposal for a 15% limit on 
total media market revenue share.  
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That the BBC should be included in the measurement of plurality is equally a point of consensus. 
However, none of the groups examined have suggest that the BBC should be subject to 
plurality remedies and a clear majority of groups are explicitly against this. Proposed structural 
and behavioural remedies are already covered by existing public service regulation, to which 
the BBC is subject. It is precisely because public service regulation would be unduly 
burdensome and inappropriate for publishers given free speech concerns, that a distinct and 
light-touch regime is needed for dealing with significant concentrations of commercial media 
power. 
 
In light of this, a position that would seem to carry the strongest support among the civil society 
groups listed above (who have been active on this issue) is summarised in Table 2.  
 
Table 2: Possible consensual position based on civil society responses 
SECTOR LIMITS BASED ON 
AUDIENCE SHARE? 
CROSS MEDIA 
LIMITS BASED 
ON REVENUE 
SHARE? 
BBC INCLUDED 
IN 
MEASUREMENT? 
BBC 
INCLUDED 
IN 
REMEDIES? 
Yes – 15% lower limit triggering 
prescribed public interest 
obligations. Upper limit of 20 or 
25% triggering structural remedy 
Yes – 15% limit 
based on Enders’ 
total media 
market definition 
Yes No 
 
 
A clear majority of the groups listed in Table 5 (including Avaaz, Enders, MRC and the Media 
Standards Trust) are explicitly opposed to leaving significant discretionary power in the hands of 
Ofcom or ministers, which is implicit in the public interest test. This would require clear 
definitions of the range of applicable remedies under different circumstances to be enshrined in 
statute. It would also ensure that policy responses to market concentrations will be intrinsically 
transparent. 
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A broad consensus of concerned civil society groups advocates a system of ownership limits 
both within and across markets with prescribed remedies; that includes the BBC in the 
measurement of plurality, but not in remedies; and that above all establishes in statute ‘clear 
bright lines’ triggering appropriate remedies. 
 
‘Clear bright lines’ do not imply that a system of ownership limits cannot take account of 
contextual factors. Provided a suitable range of remedies are clearly defined in response to 
particular circumstances, and provided that the system itself is subject to periodic review, it can 
allow for a degree of flexibility and certainty whilst minimising discretionary power. The majority 
of proposals considered here advocate behavioural remedies or public interest obligations to be 
triggered at a lower consumption share threshold of 15%, with structural remedies requiring 
divestment or dispersal of shareholdings at an upper threshold of 20% or 25%. Provided that 
both behavioural and structural remedies are principally oriented towards distancing proprietors 
from editorial output, and provided that they include a sufficiently broad range of remedies 
appropriate to different markets and circumstances, there is little basis on which to believe they 
will act as deterrents to innovation of growth. 
 
Furthermore, this brief has shown that even at the lower levels of share limits proposed (15% or 
20%), the impact on existing market conditions would be moderate overall if the BBC is included 
in measurement and existing controls on broadcasters were factored into plurality assessments. 
They would be significant only in the national newspaper market where a relatively high level of 
concentration pertains, but even here they would impact only on the two largest groups (News 
UK Ltd and DMGT).This picture is summarised in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3: Media groups providing wholesale news that would be affected by proposed 
public interest thresholds of 15% and ownership limits of 25% 
National 
newspapers 
Local 
newspapers 
Radio Television Online Cross-
media 
News UK Ltd – 
structural remedy 
 
DMGT – public 
interest obligations 
Trinity Mirror – 
public interest 
obligations 
Sky – 
structural 
remedy* 
ITN – public 
interest 
obligations** 
None  None  
 
*Where a given market is not able to support additional providers as a result of divestment alternative structural remedies could 
be used as described above 
**As suggested above, intervention might be redundant here if impartiality rules are considered to offer, by default, sufficient 
protection of editorial autonomy from shareholder influence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
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As mentioned previously, there is precedent in merger conditions, which could be used as a 
basis for developing more robust protections for editorial and journalist autonomy. Such 
protections would be appropriate at the lower limit of 15% since they would not affect 
shareholdings directly. At the upper limit, divestment would clearly be the most effective means 
of enhancing plurality. This would also make the most sense if any media group was to breach 
the cross-sector limit, given that their share would necessarily comprise a plethora of distinct 
media assets. But where an individual market is not able to support additional providers as a 
result of divestment, or where a single outlet breaches a ceiling limit, alternative structural 
remedies could be applied with a view to eliminating a controlling interest within the outlet or 
group in question.  
 
Such a regime need not therefore threaten the viability of particular titles, nor unduly penalise 
competitiveness. Remedies triggered by both the lower and upper limits could be tailored 
towards distancing proprietors from the editorial output of their titles. This strategy could 
therefore deal with the substance of plurality concerns whilst ensuring that limits are effective 
and appropriate even for print news markets facing economic decline. 
 
The reason many of the civil society groups give for insisting on such statutory limits is that only 
by eliminating discretionary power in the hands of ministers, and minimising it in the hands of 
regulators, can plurality reform deal with the root cause of media capture exposed in the 
Leveson hearings.   
 
The proposed system of ownership limits, drawn from the most common position of civil society 
groups (as described above), exhibits three further strengths in the context of on-going 
deliberation over plurality reform: 
 
1. First, it strikes a balance between those who argue that ownership limits should merely 
prevent further concentration in media markets, and those who believe it should deal 
principally with existing bottlenecks.  
 
2. Tackling cross-media concentration alone does not capture inter-media agenda influence. 
Newspapers might be facing structural decline in revenues, but this does not necessarily 
translate into declining influence over other media, and the news and policy agenda more 
broadly.10 Also, one third of the population continues to rely exclusively on one medium 
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for news and information.11 Whether by personal choice, media literacy or access 
barriers, plurality controls are needed to ensure that this substantive proportion of the 
population are exposed to a diversity of voices. 
 
3. This policy deals with both the special contribution of news and current affairs to 
informing citizens in a democracy (within sectors), as well as the wider contribution to 
culture and plurality offered by other forms of media content (at the cross-media level).  
 
In sum, statutory ownership limits are supported by concerned civil society groups as 
mechanisms to guard against the kind of surreptitious cross-influence between media 
proprietors and policy-makers exposed in some detail during the Leveson hearings. Testing the 
proposed limits using recent data on the current media UK markets demonstrates that such 
limits would not result in drastic overhauls in the industry and need not threaten the viability of 
any media outlet or unduly penalise the success or endurance of individual market players. 
They can be applied in such a way as to address the broad range of concerns invoked by 
concentration in a converged media environment and amidst structural decline in print news 
markets.
 
A system for measuring and applying limits, triggering 
appropriate and tailored remedies, is both feasible and 
recommended if the UK is to demonstrate global leadership in 
fostering a more democratic, plural and accountable media. 
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1 This brief does not presume to give a definitive measurement for media plurality in the UK, but to model the limits 
proposed using market measurement data commonly used in the industry in order to contribute to discussion on these 
proposals.  
2 For details of Avaaz, NUJ and MRC proposals, among others, see http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/communications/Mediaplurality/MediaPluralityEvidence.pdf 
3 This analysis is derived from statistics gathered by the Joint Industry Committee for 
Regional Press Research, forthcoming in Media Reform Coalition (2013), The Elephant in the Room: A survey of media 
ownership and plurality in the UK. 
4 Ofcom (2010) Report on public interest test on the proposed acquisition of British Sky Broadcasting Group plc by News 
Corporation http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/public-interest-test-nov2010/statement/public-
interest-test-report.pdf p 37 
5 See http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/statement/Annex4.pdf p. 29 
(accessed 26 October 2013) 
6 For further details of this proposals, see http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2012/07/Annex-1-
to-Submission-by-Claire-Enders-Enders-Analysis.pdf 
7 Ofcom (2012), News Consumption in the UK. Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/measuring-plurality/statement/Annex4.pdf 
8 For full details of all submissions see http://www.parliament.uk/documents/lords-
committees/communications/Mediaplurality/MediaPluralityEvidence.pdf 
9 Arguably Enders Analysis is not a civil society organisation as it is a private company; however its submission to the 
Inquiry was self-initiated and not commissioned for commercial purposes or the purposes of lobbying. The term civil 
society groups is used to refer to all for the sake of simplicity.  
10 See J. Schlosberg (2013), Power Beyond Scrutiny: Media, Justice and Accountability. London: Pluto. 
11 Ofcom, News Consumption in the UK - 2013 Report. Available at 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/research/tv-research/news/News_Report_2013.pdf (accessed 26 
October2013) 
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